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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 62 APRIL 1964 No. 6 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF 
NONEXTRADITION OF POLITICAL OFFENDERS 
Manuel R. Garcia-Mora* 
T HE unprecedented crimes against humanity committed by the Nazi leaders before and during World War II raised a 
vital question concerning the surrender of these men by the States 
in which they had later taken refuge. Although the civilized world 
was rightfully shocked and indignant at the cold, calculated bru-
tality with which these crimes were committed, serious legal prob-
lems arose as to whether the persons who committed these offenses 
were subject to surrender under the existing extradition law and 
practice.1 The most critical problem thus presented was whether 
crimes against humanity could properly be regarded as "political 
offenses" for which extradition is not generally granted.2 Although 
the leaders of the United Nations alliance at that time stated that 
those participating in "atrocities, massacres and executions" would 
be sent back to the countries in which "their abominable deeds 
were done in order that they may be judged and punished,"3 the 
matter still had to be decided by each individual country of refuge 
on the basis of its own extradition law. It is true, of course, that 
most of the persons guilty of crimes against humanity were ad-
equately tried and punished by tribunals set up after World War 
II. However, it is also true that many other persons liable to 
prosecution on this charge are still at large in the territory of 
foreign States. Moreover, crimes against humanity are not in-
frequent in countries with dictatorial and tyrannical regimes. 
Therefore, the question of surrendering fugitives accused of these 
offenses remains a basic and contemporary problem of interna-
• Professor of Law, Fordham University.-Ed. 
1 For problems in this area, see 12 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 190 (1945). 
2 See generally G.ARcfA-MoRA, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
73-102 (1956). 
8 See the joint declaration of Nov. 1, 1943, issued by President Roosevelt, Prime 
Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin (Moscow Declaration). For text, see 9 DEP'T STATE 
BULL. 310-ll (1943). 
928 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
tional extradition law.4 It is thus the purpose of this article to 
discuss the nature of crimes against humanity in an effort to de-
termine whether they can be classified as political offenses. It is 
hoped that from the uncertainty and confusion which appear to 
underlie the practice of the State, some useful legal principles 
may be extracted. 
I. THE NATURE OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
A. Jurisdiction of War Crimes Tribunals Regarding Crimes 
Against Humanity 
The technical conception of crimes against humanity perhaps 
can be approached best from the standpoint of the Niirnberg 
Charter and Judgment. Under the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal that sat at Niirnberg,5 crimes against humanity 
consist in "murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and 
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or 
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in viola-
tion of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated."6 A 
similiar provision was included in the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal for the Far East,7 under which the Japanese 
leaders were tried and punished.8 Although at first glance it ap-
pears that crimes against humanity include any of the inhumane 
acts enumerated in the Charter, which were committed either be-
fore or during the war, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was sub-
stantially restricted in that these crimes were made punishable 
only in so far as they were committed "in execution of or in con-
nection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal."9 
4 Thus, most recently the Supreme Court of Chile refused the extradition to ·west 
Germany of a former Nazi secret service officer accused of the murder of some 90,000 Jews 
in the Soviet Union. N.Y. Times, April 28, 1963, p. 13, col. 4. This problem of extraditing 
persons accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity was adverted to in Neumann, 
Neutral States and the Extradition of War Criminals, 45 AM. J. INT'L L. 495, 503·05 (1951). 
5 Text in 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR "\VAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL 11 (1947). 
6 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nilrnberg art. 6, para. (c). 
7 Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 5, para. (c). 
8 For a discussion of the trial under this Charter, see KEENAN &: BROWN, CRIMES AGAINST 
INTERNATIONAL LAw chs. 1, 3-4 (1950). 
9 This restriction to the Nilrnberg Charter as regards the crimes enumerated therein 
apparently did not exist in the original Four-Power Agreement of Aug. 8, 1945, signed 
at London providing for the establishment of the International Military Tribunal for 
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It is therefore clear that in order for these inhumane acts to con-
stitute crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, it was essential that they be connected with crimes 
against peace10 or with war crimes11 as described in the Niirnberg 
Charter. The limited scope of the jurisdiction thus established can 
be most instructively illustrated by the N iirnberg Judgment itself, 
for in describing crimes against humanity it sharply said: 
"With regard to Crimes against Humanity there is no 
doubt whatever that political opponents were murdered in 
Germany before the war, and that many of them were kept 
in concentration camps in circumstances of great horror and 
cruelty. The policy of terror was certainly carried out on a 
vast scale, and in many cases was organized and systematic .... 
To constitute Crimes against Humanity, the acts relied on 
before the outbreak of war must have been in execution of, 
or in connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal. The Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting 
and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been sat-
isfactorily proved that they were done in execution of, or in 
connection with, any such crime. The Tribunal therefore can-
not make a general declaration that the acts before 1939 were 
Crimes against Humanity within the meaning of the Charter, 
but from the beginning of the war in 1939 War Crimes were 
committed on a vast scale, which were also Crimes against 
Humanity; and insofar as the inhumane acts charged in the 
Indictment, and committed after the beginning of the war, 
did not constitute War Crimes, they were all committed in 
execution of, or in connection with, the aggressive war, and 
therefore constituted Crimes against Humanity."12 
The net effect of the above holding is far-reaching on two 
grounds. First, within the limits laid down by the Tribunal, it is 
quite possible-indeed, it was so under the Niirnberg Judgment-
that acts committed before a war, no matter how horrible and 
atrocious, unless connected with crimes against peace or with war 
the prosecution and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis. The 
Amendment to the Charter was made under the Berlin Protocol of Oct. 6, 1945. For 
the story of how the amendment was made, see Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law 
of Nations, 64 L.Q. REv. 97, 103 (1948). 
10 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Niirnberg art. 6, para. (a). 
11 Id. para. (b). 
12 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL 254-55 (1947). (Emphasis added.) For reference to pre-war persecutions, see 
id. at 282. 
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crimes proper, would technically fall outside of the concept of 
crimes against humanity and, thus, not be punishable at all under 
international law.13 Second, within the terms of the Niirnberg 
Judgment, the characterization of crimes against humanity can 
properly be denied to acts done before a war, even if committed 
in connection with or in execution of any crime within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal.14 In view of the fact that the Tribunal 
was expressly directed to consider crimes against humanity com-
mitted "before or during the war," this second restriction acquires 
a special significance since it limited the jurisdiction of the Tribu-
nal, apparently in violation of the terms of the Charter.15 Purely 
as a matter of future law, these two limitations upon the Tribu-
nal's jurisdiction rule out the possibility that crimes against hu-
manity embrace violations of the standards of decency and human-
ity to which all human beings are entitled under conditions of 
both peace and war.16 This result runs contrary to the prescrip-
tions of a modern law of nations deeply concerned with the welfare 
of the individual.17 It scarcely needs reminding that totalitarian 
States and tyrannical regimes are amazingly callous in their lack 
of respect for human dignity and their estimate of the value of 
human life. It is, therefore, a sad commentary upon international 
law that unless connected with war crimes or crimes against peace, 
13 This point may be emphasized by quoting from the opinion of the Tribunal: "The 
Tribunal is of course bound by the Charter, in the definition which it gives both of War 
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. With respect to War Crimes, however, as has 
already been pointed out, the crimes defined by Article 6, Section (b), of the Charter 
were already recognized as War Crimes under international law." Id. at 253. The inference 
of this statement that crimes against humanity were not, in the view of the Tribunal, 
crimes against international law cannot be avoided. This conviction seems to have per• 
meated the drafting of the Niirnberg Charter, for in a memorandum of Jan. 22, 1945, 
sent by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State to the President, the former 
expressed misgivings about the legality of punishing the Nazi leaders for atrocities com-
mitted in time of peace. The Legal Adviser felt that "These pre-war atrocities are neither 
'war crimes' in the technical sense, nor offenses against international law; and the extent 
to which they may have been in violation of German Law, as changed by the Nazis, is 
doubtful. Nevertheless, the declared policy of the United Nations is that these crimes, 
too, shall be punished and the interests of postwar security and of necessary rehabilitation 
of the German peoples, as well as the demands of justice, require that this be done." 
See [1945] FOREIGN REL. U.S. 403-05 (1955). 
14 See 2 SIBERT, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBUC 592 (1951). 
15 See LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAw AND HUMAN RIGHTS 36 (1950). See also 
Schwarzenberger, The Judgment of Nuremberg, 21 TuL. L. REv. 329, 353 (1947). 
16 I SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAw 321 (2d ed. 1949). 
17 Thus, in its Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the 
Niirnberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, the United Nations Inter-
national Law Commission said that crimes against humanity "may take place also before 
a war in connexion with crimes against peace." International Law Comm'n, Report, 
U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc., 5th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 14 (A/1316) (1950). 
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atrocities committed by dictatorial regimes in peacetime and 
against their own people are likely to remain unpunished.18 
It is, of course, quite possible to argue that the restrictive 
scope of crimes against humanity here described was merely in-
tended to limit the jurisdiction of the Niirnberg Tribunal, and 
not to limit the substantive nature of crimes against humanity 
under international law.19 It is thus of some interest to observe 
that in the celebrated Eichmann case, an Israeli court proceeded 
on this assumption in convicting Eichmann under the terms of an 
indictment which included crimes against humanity, although the 
court explicitly stated that most of Eichmann's crimes were com-
mitted during the war.20 But long before this case, the more ac-
ceptable view of regarding crimes against humanity as including 
offenses committed before or during a war received some support 
from the enactment of the Allied Control Council Law No. 10,21 
which provided for the prosecution and punishment of the so-
called minor war criminals by military tribunals to be set up by 
various nations.22 The pertinent provision of this law says: 
"Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime: 
"Crimes Against Humanity: Atrocities and offenses, in-
cluding but not limited to murder, extermination, enslave-
ment, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhu-
mane acts committed against any civilian population, or per-
secutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or 
not in violation of the domestic laws of the country where 
perpetrated."23 
Clearly, then, in principle the military tribunals established un-
18 Cf. McDOUGAL&: ASSOCIATES, STUDIES IN WoRLD PuBUC ORDER 366-67 (1960). 
10 LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 15, at 36. This was also the opinion of some 
delegates to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in discussing the Principles 
of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Niirnberg Tribunal and in the 
Judgment of the Tribunal formulated by the International Law Commission. See SOHN, 
CASES ON UNITED NATIONS LAW 980 (1956). 
20 For the opinion of the court, see 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 805, 828 (1962). For discussion 
of the legal issues involved, see Baade, The Eichmann Trial: Some Legal Aspects, 1961 
DUKE L.J. 400. 
21 For the text of this law, see Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on 
the Niirnberg War Crimes Trials Under Control Council Law No. IO, at 250 (1949). 
22 For the laws of the various countries providing for the establishment of tribunals 
for the trial of war criminals, see [1947] Ann. Dig. 292-95. For discussion on the work of 
these tribunals, see McDOUGAL &: FEUCIANO, LAw AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBUC ORDER: 
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 706-12 (1961); STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS 
OF INTERNATIONAL CONFUCTS 374 (1954). 
28 Control Council Law No. IO art. II, sec. 1, para. (c). 
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der Control Council Law No. 10 were given a broader scope of 
jurisdiction to consider crimes against humanity committed by 
the Nazi officials from the beginning of the Nazi regime right down 
to the end of World War II. The four Powers who agreed to this 
provision undoubtedly intended that no limitation would exist 
upon the jurisdiction of these tribunals.24 Yet if that provision 
were to be given the wide meaning thus intended, it would surely 
have produced an inevitable conflict with the precedent estab-
lished by the N iirnberg Judgment. Indeed, the moral and legal 
confusion on this issue was reflected in the contradictions of the 
United States military tribunals established at Niirnberg under 
Control Council Law No. 10. Thus, in the Flick case25 involving 
the trial of a leading German industrialist and five others closely 
associated with him in his industrial enterprises, on the charge, 
inter alia, of crimes against humanity, the Tribunal decisively 
rejected the contention that these crimes included atrocities com-
mitted before 1939: 
"In the IMT trial the Tribunal declined to take jurisdiction 
of crimes against humanity occurring before 1 September 
1939, basing its ruling on the modifying phrase, 'in execu-
tion of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdic-
tion of the Tribunal,' found in Article 6 (a) [sic] of the Char-
ter attached to the London Agreement of 8 August 1945. It 
is argued that the omission of this phrase from Control Coun-
cil Law No. 10 evidences an intent to broaden the jurisdic-
tion of this Tribunal to include such crimes. We find no 
support for the argument in express language of Law No. 
10 .... Crimes committed before the war and having no con-
nection therewith were not in contemplation .... So far as 
we are advised, no one else has been prosecuted to date in any 
of these courts including IMT for crimes committed before 
and wholly unconnected with the war. We can see no pur-
pose nor mandate in the chartering legislation of this Tribu-
nal requiring it to take jurisdiction of such cases."26 
A substantially similar result was reached in the Ministries 
case27 involving the prosecution of eighteen ministers or high 
24 Brand, Crimes Against Humanity and the Nilrnberg Trials, 28 ORE. L. REv. 93, 
116 (1949). 
25 United States v. Flick, 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NiiRNBERG MILITARY 
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 3 (1952) [hereinafter cited as WAR 
CRIMES REPORTS]. 
26 Id. at 1212-13. 
27 United States v. Weizsaecker, 12 WAR CRIMES REPORTS I (1951). 
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officials in the Foreign Office and other state departments of the 
German Reich. While the counts of the indictment included 
crimes against humanity, the tribunal limited its jurisdiction to 
crimes committed during the war and in connection with war 
crimes or crimes against peace.28 In contrast, in the Justice case,29 
dealing with the prosecution of fourteen judges, public prosecu-
tors or high officials of the Reich Ministry of Justice, in referring 
to the provisions of the N iirnberg Charter and of the Control 
Council Law No. IO which provide for the prosecution of crimes 
against humanity, the tribunal succinctly said: 
"Obviously, these sections are not surplusage. They supple-
ment the preceding sections on war crimes and include within 
their prohibition not only war crimes, but also acts not in-
cluded within the preceding definitions of war crimes .... As 
we construe it, that section [of Control Council Law No. 10] 
provides for the punishment of crimes committed against 
German nationals only where there is proof of conscious par-
ticipation in systematic government organized or approved 
procedures .... Thus the statute is limited by construction 
to the type of criminal activity which prior to 1939 was and 
still is a matter of international concern."30 
Perhaps even more explicit is the opinion of the Tribunal in 
the Einsatzgruppen case,31 which clearly held that Control Council 
Law No. IO did not limit the jurisdiction of the war crimes tribu-
nals to wartime offenses, but included "all crimes against hu-
manity as long known and understood under the general principles 
of criminal law."32 Although moral sentiment undoubtedly sup-
ports the latter view, the opinions in the Flick and Ministries 
cases probably represent the existing law. The latter proposi-
tion, however, is still subject to considerable controversy and 
doubt,33 for in the revised version of the Draft Code of Offenses 
28 14 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 467 (1952). 
20 United States v. Altstoetter, 3 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 3 (1951). 
80 Id. at 972, 982. (Emphasis added.) See also the case decided by the Spruchgericht 
at Stade, Germany, in 1947, in which the accused was convicted of membership in the 
criminal organization of the S.S., knowing that the organization was guilty of crimes 
against humanity. [1947] Ann. Dig. 100 (No. 38). In interpreting Control Council Law 
No. IO, the court said: "Law No. 10 provides that all criminal acts enumerated therein 
are crimes against humanity. As it does not require any connection with war, criminal 
acts committed before September 1, 1939, must also be regarded as such." Id. at 101. 
81 United States v. Ohlendorf, 4 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 3 (1950). 
82 Id. at 499. 
83 Paoli, Contribution a l'Etude des Crimes de Guerre et des Crimes Cantre l'Humanite 
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Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the 
United Nations International Law Commission at its six.th session 
in 1954,34 crimes against humanity are specifically included as 
crimes under international law and need not be connected with 
war crimes or crimes against peace. The pertinent provision of 
the Draft Code regards as crimes under international law, 
"inhuman acts such as murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation or persecutions, committed against any civilian 
population on social, racial, religious or cultural grounds by 
the authorities of a state or by private individuals acting at 
the instigation or with the toleration of such authorities."35 
It can be readily seen, therefore, that under the Draft Code the 
possibility of successful prosecution on charges of crimes against 
humanity both in peace and in war has been greatly enlarged. 
Moreover, that these offenses may be committed by the authorities 
of the State as well as by private individuals36 constitutes another 
radical departure from the N iirnberg Charter and Control Coun-
cil Law No. 10, for under these two instruments the acts of private 
persons were totally excluded.37 It should be noted, however, that 
the Draft Code is innovatory rather than declaratory of existing 
law, but if it should gain acceptance by the States, most of the 
loopholes regarding crimes against humanity which exist in the 
N iirnberg precedents will effectively be closed.38 
With this background in mind, it is now pertinent to explore 
in some detail just what a crime against humanity is, so that this 
conception may be more accurately viewed from the standpoint of 
political offenses. 
en Droit Penal International, 39 REVUE GiNERALE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL Punuc 129 
(1945). 
34 Text in International Law Comm'n, Report, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc., 9th Sess., 
Supp. No. 9, at 10-11 (A/2693) (1954). 
35 1954 Draft Code art. II, para. 11. This was previously para. IO. 
36 For a full discussion of the Draft Code from the standpoint of the responsibility 
of private persons, see GARCiA.-MoRA, INTERNATIONAL REsPoNSIBILlTY FOR HoSI'ILE Acrs OF 
PRIVATE PERSONS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES 36-46 (1962). 
37 2 SIBERT, op. dt. supra note 14, at 591. As to the interpretation of Control Council 
Law No. 10, see United States v. Flick, 6 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 1216 (1952), where the 
tribunal said that "crimes against humanity as defined in Control Council Law No. 10 
must be strictly construed to exclude isolated cases of atrocity or persecution whether 
committed by private individuals or governmental authority." An exactly identical holding 
is found in United States v. Altstoetter, 3 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 3, 982 (1951). 
38 See Carjeu, Quelques Aspects du Nouveau Projet de Statut des Nations Unies pour 
une Juridiction Criminelle Internationale, 60 REvuE GENERAL DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL 
Punuc 401 (1956). 
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B. Crimes Against Humanity Proper 
More comprehensively considered, two categories of crimes 
against humanity were distinguished in the N iirnberg Charter39 
and in Control Council Law No. 10.40 The first category included 
"murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population .... " In 
an effort to clarify these concepts, a United States military tribu-
nal at N iirnberg most inclusively regarded as crimes against 
humanity murder, torture, enslavement, "acts committed in the 
course of wholesale and systematic violation of life and liberty" 
and infringements on "freedom of opinion ... the moral or physi-
cal integrity of the family ... or the dignity of the human being, 
by reason of his opinion, his race, caste, family or profession .... "41 
A careful examination of the decisions of the war crimes tribunals 
at once reveals that the crime against humanity count was gen-
erally assessed in the light of principles of common humanity that 
all civilized men are presumed to k.now.42 From this perspective, 
the extermination of persons under an alleged "euthanasia pro-
gram,"43 the deportation of inhabitants of occupied countries to 
slave labor camps,44 the use of concentration camp labor in the 
course of which individuals were ill-treated, tortured, and killed,45 
the mass extermination, torture, and mutilation of the civil popu-
89 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Niirnberg art. 6, para. (c). 
40 Control Council Law No. 10 art. II, sec. l, para. (c). 
41 United States v. Ohlendorf (The Einsatzgruppen case), 4 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 1, 
498 (1950). Part of this definition was actually taken from one given by the Counselor 
of the Vatican at the 8th Conference for the Unification of Penal Law held on July 11, 
1947. Ibid. Also a German court in 1947 said that deprivation of liberty is a crime against 
humanity. The court stressed that "amongst 'inhuman acts' deprivation of liberty must 
be included, particularly as the human personality is more severely affected thereby 
than by deportation." [1947] Ann. Dig. 100, 101 (No. 38). 
42 See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note 22, at 691-92. 
48 United States v. Greifelt, 5 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 89 (1950). It should be added, 
however, that the defendant was acquitted on the crime against humanity charge because 
the crime was directed against the nationals of his own State, that is, German nationals. 
Nevertheless, the tribunal intimated that it would be a crime against humanity if com-
mitted against inhabitants under belligerent occupation. Yet in United States v. Altstoetter 
austice case), 3 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 3 (1951), the tribunal held that inhuman acts 
committed by Germans against German nationals constituted punishable crimes against 
humanity. Id. at 982. In this respect apparently there is a difference of opinion among 
the war crimes tribunals. See generally GouI.D, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 657 
(1957). 
44 United States v. Milch, 2 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 353 (1947). The tribunal pointed 
out that Milch had participated in the terrorization, enslavement, and murder of Jews 
in Germany long before the outbreak of the War. See also United States v. List (Hostages 
case), 11 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 759 (1950). 
45 United States v. Krauch (I. G. Farben case), 7 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 1 (1953). 
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lation in occupied countries,46 and many other similar atrocities,47 
are all held to be crimes against humanity. It may also be noted 
that under the Niirnberg Charter and Control Council Law No. 
10, "other inhumane acts against any civilian population" were 
similarly regarded as crimes against humanity. Thus, illustrations 
of acts so characterized by the war crimes tribunals include acts of 
terrorism against the civilian population, 48 the exposure of the 
population of occupied countries to bad weather conditions,49 
dispossessing persons of all means of subsistence,"0 compelling 
prisoners of war and civilians to submit to medical experiments 
resulting in brutalities, torture, disabling injury, and death,51 sep-
arating newly born children from their parents and subjecting 
them to insanitary conditions and medical neglect, thus causing 
the death of a large number of these children,52 and the murdering 
of foreign workers deported from their countries.53 In respect to 
offenses against property, a United States military tribunal care-
fully drew a distinction between "industrial property" on the one 
hand, and "the dwellings, household furnishings, and food sup-
plies of a persecuted people," on the other, reaching the conclusion 
that offenses against industrial property did not constitute crimes 
against humanity.54 As to offenses against "the dwellings, house-
hold furnishings, and food supplies of persecuted people," un-
fortunately it is not very clear whether they are crimes against 
humanity, for the tribunal left the matter unsettled and subject 
to much speculation and doubt. What may be stressed, however, 
46 United States v. Ohlendorf (The Einsatzgruppen case), 4 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 3 
(1950). 
47 See Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 178 (1946). See also 
Graven, Les Crimes Contre l'Humanite, 76 REcUEIL DES CoURS, ACADEMIE DE DROlT 
INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE 433 (1950) [hereinafter cited as HAGUE REcuEIL]. 
48 In re Gerbsch, Special Court, Amsterdam, First Chamber, Holland, April 28, 1948, 
[1948] Ann. Dig. 491, 498 (No. 155). See also In re Bellmer, Special Criminal Court, Second 
Chamber, Leeuwarden, Holland, June 20, 1949, [1950] Ann. Dig. 392 (No. 124). 
49 See 2 DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: GENOCIDE 185 (1959). 
50 Ibid. 
51 United States v. Pohl, 5 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 195 (1950). See also United States v. 
Brandt (Medical case), 1 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 3 (1949). It is interesting to note that in 
this case the tribunal said: "Manifestly human experiments under such conditions are 
contrary to 'the principles of the laws of nations as they result from the usages established 
among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of public 
conscience." 2 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 183 (1949). 
52 In re Gerike, 7 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 76 (1948), [1947] Ann. Dig. 304. 
53 In re Wagner, 13 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 118 (1949), [1947] Ann. Dig. 305. 
54 United States v. Flick, 6 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 1214 (1952). This decision was 
followed in the subsequent case, United States v. Krauch (I.G. Farben case), 8 WAR CRIMES 
REPORTS 1130 (1952). 
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is that the extent to which offenses against personal property can 
be regarded as crimes against humanity would depend entirely 
upon the degree to which the actors deprive the persecuted people 
of certain human necessities, such as shelter, food supply and em-
ployment.55 
In an attempt to compile the above offenses in a comprehensive 
code designed for future application, it has already been seen that 
the United Nations International Law Commission described in-
human acts in its Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind,56 as including "murder, extermination, en-
slavement, deportation or persecutions, committed against any civil-
ian population on social, political, racial, religious or cultural 
grounds by the authorities of a State or by private individuals 
acting at the instigation or with the toleration of such authori-
ties."57 While the Draft Code evidently seeks to project much the 
same policy that the Niirnberg Charter sought to apply in respect 
to crimes against humanity, it has, however, enlarged the scope of 
such crimes by freeing them from any necessary relationship with 
war crimes or crimes against peace. 58 It is therefore clear that 
under the Draft Code crimes against humanity have become a 
separate and independent category of international crimes. 
Wholly apart from the provisions of the Draft Code, which 
are really presented de lege ferenda, the Geneva Convention No. 
IV of August 12, 1949, Relative to the Protection of Civilian Per-
sons in Time of War, 59 marks an important step in the protection 
of the civilian population in an international war. After provid-
ing generally that "protected persons"00 are to be treated humanely 
under all circumstances without any distinction based on race, 
55 See Brand, The War Crimes Trials and the Laws of War, 26 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 
414, 423 (1949). 
50 For the text of the 1951 Draft Code, see International Law Comm'n, Report, 
U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc., 6th Sess., Supp. No. 9, at 10-14 (A/ 1858) (1951). For the text 
of the revised Draft of 1954, see note 34 supra. 
57 1954 Draft Code, art. II, para. II. 
58 Johnson, The Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
4 INT'L &: CoMP. L.Q. 445, 450 (1955). See also Graven, Principes Fondamentaux d'un Code 
Repressif des Crimes Contre la Paix et la Securite de l'Humanite, 28 REvuE DE DRorr 
INTERNATIONAL 173, 191-204 (1950). 
50 This Convention entered into force on Oct. 21, 1950. For text, see [1955] 
3 U.S.T. &: O.I.A. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365 (effective Feb. 2, 1956). 
oo Under Article 4 of the Convention "protected persons" include civilians who "at a 
given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves in the hands of a power 
with whom their country is at war or under belligerent occupation. See Yingling &: 
Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 393, 411 (1952). 
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religion, sex, or political opinion, the Convention goes on to say 
more particularly that the signatory States 
" ... specifically agree that each of them is prohibited from 
taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical 
suffering or extermination of protected persons in their 
hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, 
corporal punishment, mutilation and medical or scientific ex-
periments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a pro-
tected person, but also to any other measures of brutality 
whether applied by civilian or military agents."61 
This provision strongly reflects the influence of the N iirnberg 
Charter and the accumulated experience of the war crimes trials, 
and represents a determined effort to prevent unnecessary physical 
suffering of the civilian population during war and belligerent 
occupation. 62 Unfortunately, however, this prohibition operates 
only in time of war and belligerent occupation, so that the enslave-
ment and extermination of people, as done by the Nazi regime 
before the outbreak of World War II, are clearly not prohibited. 
The second category of crimes against humanity described 
in the Niirnberg Charter and Control Council Law No. 10 in-
cluded "persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds." 
In their historical perspective, the crimes included in this category 
were obviously inspired by the ruthless Nazi persecutions of the 
Jews and other European minorities.63 The specific types of per-
secutions included such old-fashioned practices of tyrannical re-
gimes as the murder and internment in concentration camps of 
political opponents, the repression of political opinion, the de-
portation and execution of those likely to be hostile to the govern-
ment, and the persecution and murder of the members of minori-
ties. The Niirnberg Tribunal made reference to these practices 
in the following terms: 
"With regard to Crimes against Humanity, there is no 
doubt whatever that political opponents were murdered in 
Germany before the war, and that many of them were kept 
in concentration camps in circumstances of great horror and 
cruelty. The policy of terror was certainly carried out on a 
61 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War 
art. 32. 
62 See Gutteridge, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 26 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 294, 322 
(1949). 
63 See 2 DRosr, op. cit. supra note 49, at 185. 
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vast scale, and in many cases was organized and systematic. 
The policy of persecution, repression, and murder of civilians 
in Germany before the war of 1939, who were likely to be 
hostile to the Government, was most ruthlessly carried out. 
The persecution of Jews during the same period is established 
beyond all doubt."6' 
More specific examples of the general policy of persecution 
pursued by the Nazi regime may be drawn from practically every 
case decided by the war crimes tribunals. More familiar, perhaps, 
are the persecutions against the Christian churches initiated early 
by the Nazi regime,65 the internment and murder of Catholic 
priests and nuns in concentration camps,66 the systematic program 
of genocide aimed at the destruction of foreign nations and ethnic 
groups by the elimination and suppression of national character-
istics, 117 the use of extraordinary courts for the prosecution of po-
litical opponents, 68 the subjection of Jews and of nationals of East-
ern countries to discriminatory and special penal laws and trials, 69 
and the sterilization and castration of members of certain specified 
ethnic groups.70 It may be added that there was an impressive 
consensus among the war crimes tribunals that all these acts of 
persecution were carried out pursuant to a declared policy of the 
Nazi government, so that, consistent with the Niirnberg Judgment, 
there was technically a direct connection between specific acts of 
persecution and the execution of a governmental policy.71 
The foregoing crimes have been incorporated in a more en-
during form in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide,72 adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly on December 9, 1948, and ratified by a sub-
stantial number of States. The Convention provides that genocide 
is a crime under international law, whether committed in peace 
6i 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL 254 (1947). 
CIIS United States v. Weizsaecker (Ministries case), 14 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 467 (1952). 
oo Ibid. 
67 United States v. Greifelt, 5 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 89 (1950); United States v. 
Ohlendorf (Einsatzgruppen case), 4 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 3, 506 (1950). 
68 United States v. Altstoetter (Justice case), 3 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 3, 993, (1951). 
611 Ibid. 
70 United States v. Pohl, 5 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 195, 971 (1950). 
'l1 See note 37 supra. 
72 U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC., 3d Sess., 1st pt., Res. No. 260 at 174 (A/81-) (1948) 
(effective Jan. 12, 1951). For the origin and meaning of the word "genocide," see 
UMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE 79-95 (1944). 
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or in war, 73 and more specifically, declares genocide to include the 
killing of members of a group on racial or religious grounds, the 
causing of bodily or mental harm, the inflicting of conditions of 
life calculated to bring about the extermination of the group, 
the prevention of births, and the forcible transfer of children from 
one group to another.74 The Convention applies not only to 
rulers and public officials, but to private individuals as well.75 Any 
person may be indicted for the crime of genocide and for conspir-
acy, attempt, complicity, and incitement to commit the crime.76 
The enforcement of the Convention involves the incorporation 
of genocide into domestic law by the signatory States,77 the trial 
of violators by competent domestic tribunals, 78 or, ultimately, by 
an international criminal court to be established, providing the 
contracting parties recognize the jurisdiction of this court.79 Dis-
putes concerning interpretation of the Convention are to be sub-
mitted to the International Court of Justice,80 and any competent 
organ of the United Nations may be called upon to take whatever 
action may be necessary for the prevention and suppression of 
73 Genocide Convention art. I. 
74 Id. art. II. 
75 Id. art. IV. 
76 Id. art. III. 
77 Id. art. V. For constitutional problems presented in the United States with respect 
to the enforcement of the Convention, see Carlston, The Genocide Convention: A Problem 
for the American Lawyer, 36 A.B.A.J. 206 (1950); McDougal &: Arens, The Genocide 
Convention and the Constitution, 3 VAND. L. REv. 683 (1950); Phillips, The Genocide 
Convention: Its Effect on our Legal System, 35 A.B.A.J. 623 (1949). 
78 Genocide Convention art. VI. 
79 Id. art. VI. In 1951, a Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, appointed 
by the United Nations General Assembly, adopted a Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Court to try "persons accused of crimes under international law." For the text 
of the Draft Statute, see Committee on International Criminal Jurisdiction, Report, 
U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 7th Sess., Supp. No. 11, at 21-25 (A/2136) (1952). Obviously, 
genocide would fall within the jurisdiction of this court as a crime under international 
law. For this proposition, see Lemkin, Genocide as a Crime under International Law, 
41 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1947). According to article 2, paragraph 9, of the 1954 Draft Code 
of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, genocide becomes a crime under 
international law for which the responsible individuals are criminally liable. For text 
of the Draft Code, see note 34 supra. The Draft Statute for an International Criminal 
Court adopted in 1951 was subsequently revised in 1953 by the Committee on International 
Criminal Jurisdiction. For a comprehensive discussion of the Draft Statute, see GARcfA-
MoRA, op. cit. supra note 36, at 178-94. 
so Genocide Convention art. IX. On Nov. 16, 1950, the General Assembly adopted 
a resolution asking the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on 
several questions dealing with the Genocide Convention. In particular, the advisory 
opinion dealt with the position of a State ratifying the Convention with reservations in 
relation to other States that ratify the Convention without reservations. See Reservations 
to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, [1951] 
I.C.J. REP. 15. 
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genocide.81 Finally, genocide and the other acts punishable under 
the Convention are not to be considered as political offenses for 
the purpose of extradition, and the contracting parties are required 
to surrender persons accused of such crimes in accordance with 
their laws and treaties in force.82 
The comprehensive scope of applicability manifested in all of 
the above provisions reflects the demand of the world community 
that the behavior of peoples and governments be made to conform 
to standards of human rights as a framework of State policy.83 The 
manifestation of the principle of humanity in this context may 
further be seen in the Convention's twin recognition that geno-
cide may be committed both in peace and in war, and that it need 
not be connected with war crimes or with crimes against peace. In 
the former postulate, the Genocide Convention has clearly followed 
the precedents laid down in the Justice and Einsatzgruppen cases,84 
while in the latter it has substantially departed from the restrictive 
conception of the N iirnberg Charter and Judgment. Thus, by 
broadening the possibility of preventing and punishing the crime 
of genocide, the parties to the Convention have sought to eradicate 
perhaps the most insidious and destructive of all the crimes against 
humanity,85 and additionally have made genocide and the acts 
described in the Convention delicta juris gentium much in the 
manner of piracy, slave trade, counterfeiting of foreign currency, 
and the like. 86 
The foregoing exposition makes it now possible to focus more 
sharply on the question of whether crimes against humanity can 
technically be considered as political offenses. While this problem 
has come before domestic courts, 87 no uniform pattern is clearly 
discernible and it has therefore remained a most fundamental 
problem of extradition law.88 
81 Genocide Convention art. VIII. 
82 Id. art. VII. This provision is subsequently discussed in this article. 
83 See McDOUGAL&: FELICIANO, LAw AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBUC ORDER! THE LEGAL 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 542 (1961). 
84 See notes 29, 31 supra. 
85 McDOUGAL&: AssoCIATES, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBUC ORDER 346 (1960). 
86 See Kunz, The United Nations Convention on Genocide, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 738, 
745 (1949). 
87 See note 4 supra. 
88 KIRCHHEIMER, PoUTICAL JumCE: THE USE OF LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR PoUTICAL 
ENDS 380 (1961). 
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JI. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND POLITICAL OFFENSES 
It is a well established principle of extradition law that persons 
accused of political offenses are generally exempted from surrender. 
A network of extradition treaties, legislative enactments, and con-
stitutional provisions almost universally guarantee this protec-
tion. 89 Yet, there is no uniform criterion to determine which acts 
fall within this exempted category, so that it is necessary for the 
courts to decide in each specific case whether the offense involved 
is a political act or a common crime. As a guiding principle, the 
courts usually begin with the generally accepted view that, broadly 
speaking, a political offense is an act directed against the State.90 
Thus, such offenses as treason, sedition, and espionage are generally 
regarded as political-for which extradition is denied. In terms of 
the traditional law, these offenses are "purely political offenses" 
or objective offenses, since they have no element whatever of an 
ordinary crime.91 From this perspective, there can be no question 
that crimes against humanity fall outside of this description, and 
it would be highly misleading and inaccurate to treat them as 
such. The position has been taken, however, that crimes against 
humanity may more appropriately be classified in the category 
of "relative political offenses"; in this type of offense a common 
crime is so inextricably linked with a political act that the entire 
offense is regarded as political and, hence, nonextraditable. 92 The 
body of evidence thus far reviewed would seem to make it fairly 
clear that crimes against humanity are more common and, there-
fore, in order for an act to be considered as political, it must be 
shown that it was politically motivated or was directed against the 
interests of the State.93 It may accordingly be argued that since 
crimes against humanity are largely committed by rulers and 
public officials in the execution of a State policy, the acts in ques-
tion become "political" acts for which extradition should not be 
89 For a discussion of these provisions, see Garda-Mora, The Present Status of 
Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition and Asylum, 14 U. Prrr. L. REv. 371, 
378-74 (1953). 
90 For the intricacies and complexities in determining the nature of a political 
offense, see Garda-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of 
Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226 (1962). 
91 In re Fabijan, [1933-1934] Ann. Dig. 360, 363 (No. 156). 
92 For a discussion of relative political offenses, see BEAucHET, TR.AXTt DE L'EXTRADITION 
208 (1899); BILLOT, TR.A!Tt DE L'EXTRADmON 102 (1874). 
93 See Evans, Reflections Upon the Political Offense in International Practice, 57 
AM. J. lNT'L L. l (1!163). 
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granted.04 Unmistakably implicit in this assertion is a facile analogy 
drawn from another area of international law-the "act of State" 
doctrine-which allegedly confers upon the officials of a State an 
immunity from prosecution in the courts of another State.05 Wholly 
apart from the fact that the "act of State" doctrine was rejected 
as a defense by the Niirnberg Judgment96 and in decisions of the 
war crimes tribunals,97 the applicability of this doctrine in a world 
situation where public officials can potentially, and actually do 
commit all kinds of aggressions upon their people is highly ques-
tionable, to say the least. It may well be that analogies from con-
ventional rules or other principles of international law are inade-
quate to support the emergence of a more effective international 
legal order in which individuals would be criminally liable for 
international crimes.08 Reliance upon inherited principles in 
order to characterize crimes against humanity as political, merely 
because they are committed by agents of the State, amounts to 
asserting an extravagant claim for which there is no support99 in 
04 This was in fact one of the arguments put forth successfully in the case Karadzole v. 
Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded, 355 U.S. 393 (1958), 
surrender denied on remand sub nom. United States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 
(S.D. Cal. 1959). 
95 This argument is dealt with by the Niirnberg Tribunal in I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 223·24 (1947). 
96 The Niirnberg Judgment said in this connection: "The principle of international 
law, which, under certain circumstances, protects the representatives of a State, cannot 
be applied to acts which are condemned as criminal by international law. The authors 
of these acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order to be freed 
from punishment in appropriate proceedings."' Id. at 223 (1947). The "act of State" doctrine 
was treated in the same way at the Tokyo trial. See KEENAN & BROWN, CRIMES AGAINsr 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 129-32 (1950). It should be noted also that article 4 of the Draft Code 
of Offenses Against the Peace and Security of Mankind rules out the "act of State" doctrine 
in article 4 as follows: "The fact that a person charged with an offence defined in this 
Code acted pursuant to an order of his Government or of a superior does not relieve him 
of responsibility in international law if, in the circumstances at the time, it was possible 
for him not to comply with that order." For text, see note 34 supra. The "act of State" 
doctrine was also rejected by a court of appeals of the United States in respect to the 
extradition of a head of state in the celebrated case, Jimenez v. Aristeguieta, 3ll F.2d 547, 
556-58 (5th Cir. 1962). 
117 In United States v. Altstoetter austice case), 3 WAR CRIMES REPORT I, 1062 (1951), 
the tribunal said as to the "act of State" doctrine: "Each defendant has pleaded in 
effect as a defense the act of State as well as superior orders in justification or mitigation 
of any crime he may have committed • • • • 'It was submitted that international law is 
concerned with the actions of sovereign States, and provides no punishment for 
individuals; and further, that where the act in question is an act of State, those who 
carry it out are not personally responsible •••• In the opinion of the Tribunal, both 
these submissions must be rejected.' " 
98 Cf. McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note 83, at 667. 
DD In United States v. Krauch (I.G. Farben case), 8 WAR CRIMES REPORTS ll37-38 
(1953), the tribunal said: "It is beyond the authority of any nation to authorize its 
citizens to commit acts in contravention of international penal law." 
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law or in fact, and certainly affords no comfort to those who have 
been the victims of aggression upon all law and humanity. 
In deciding whether a crime is a "relative political offense," 
the courts must first determine whether there is any connection 
between the common crime involved and some political act. This 
seems to be a generally accepted practice, which apparently has 
been found to satisfy the demands of justice. Then, with respect 
to crimes against humanity, the crucial task would be to ascertain 
the degree of connection existing between these acts and a possible 
political offense. It may be pertinent to recall that the common 
theme which runs through the successive line of cases decided 
by the war crimes tribunals indicates that the unbelievable atroci-
ties committed by the Nazi leaders were not isolated and casual, 
but rather were the result of a deliberate and systematic plan to 
destroy human lives and inflict suffering upon ethnic groups 
having no relation whatever with the prosecution of the war.100 
Granting that the act of initiating a war is a purely political 
offense for which extradition may not be granted, 101 still the means 
by which hostilities are conducted must be legitimately connected 
with the war to be characterized as political. It can scarcely be 
denied that the commission of atrocities during the conduct of 
hostilities or during belligerent occupation has no connection with 
furthering the legitimate policy of the State. Certainly, the depor-
tation and enslavement of the civilian population and the elimina-
tion of racial and religious groups, to mention only two crimes 
against humanity, yield no special military significance and, in 
addition, cause unnecessary suffering and a useless destruction of 
human lives. It is therefore submitted that where the means inci-
dental to the execution of State policy result in cruelty and unneces-
sary suffering upon individuals, the acts committed to implement 
such a policy cannot be regarded as political. However, it has been 
argued that if the acts in question are proportionate to the political 
end sought, the entire act may be characterized as political.1°2 
This argument essentially injects the element of proportionality 
into the determination of a political offense. While this test may 
100 See KEENAN & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 96, at 117. 
101 For elaboration, see Garcia-Mora, The Present Status of Political Offenses in 
the Law of Extradition and Asylum, 14 U. PrIT. L. REv. 371, 394-95 (1953). 
102 See the authorities cited in STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CoNFUCTS 
361, n.68 (1954). 
1964] CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 945 
be helpful in determining the political criminality of other acts, 
such as war crimes which are likely to be committed by both sides 
during a war, 103 and which may not in every case give rise to 
criminal liability, 104 it must be rejected altogether with respect to 
crimes against humanity. It is exceedingly difficult, if not impos-
sible, to justify the massacre and enslavement of a whole popula-
tion for the sake of an illegitimate State policy. It is, therefore, the 
cruelty and atrocity, and the needless use of such means, that are 
decisive in determining whether crimes against humanity are to be 
considered political. The problem posed is not merely a pragmatic 
one of ascertaining the proportion existing between the political 
advantages gained and the use of specific means of oppression and 
destruction. Rather the problem is one of determining the ethical 
use of such means, as this ought rationally to be equated with 
legality. This is nothing more than the application of the principle 
of humanity, which is a postulate of international law, to the pur-
suit of political ends. 
The foregoing observations clearly reveal an utter lack of 
connection between crimes against humanity and any political 
objective. Moreover, this view is adequately supported by the 
domestic extradition practice of the States. Thus, while under 
American extradition law the requisite connection between a com-
mon crime and a political act has been traditionally cast in lan-
guage so abstractly broad as almost, if applied literally, to deny 
the surrender of a fugitive for the most feeble link existing be-
tween the two, 105 apparently a more realistic appraisal of the 
problem has recently compelled the United States to limit this 
broad test by requiring that the act involved be primarily a politi-
cal infraction. This departure from the traditional policy of the 
United States is found in the recent extradition treaty with BraziP06 
which, in providing for the nonextradition of political offenders, 
expressly requires that "the allegation by the person sought of 
political purpose or motive for the request for his extradition will 
not preclude that person's surrender if the crime or offense for 
103 For the application of the principle of proportionality to war crimes stricto 
sensu, see Garcia-Mora, War Crimes and the Principle of Nonextradition of Political 
Offenders, 9 WAYNE L. REv. 269 (1963). 
104 See GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAw OF LAND WARFARE 464 (1959). 
105 For a discussion of the American law, see Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political 
Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226, 1244-49 (1962). 
100 Extradition Treaty With Brazil, Jan. 13, 1961, 44 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 164, 166 
(1961). 
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which his extradition is requested is primarily an infraction of the 
ordinary penal law."107 Connection alone, therefore, is not enough 
to convert a common crime into a political act; the requirement 
has been added that the act in question be predominantly political. 
Similarly, under Swiss law, although an act may be regarded as 
political if the person sought alleges a political motive or end, this 
apparently broad test was early limited by the so-called theory 
of predominance incorporated into the Federal Law on Extradition 
enacted on January 22, 1892.108 The theory of predominance 
basically means that in a "relative political offense," the political 
element must dominate the common crime. On such a basis, it 
has been consistently held by Swiss courts that acts of atrocity out 
of proportion to the political end sought will be considered as 
common crimes and, thus, extraditable.109 In like vein, the French 
Extradition Law of March IO, 1927,110 emphatically says that acts 
committed in the course of an insurrection or a civil war will not 
be regarded as political if "they constitute acts of odious barbarism 
and vandalism prohibited by the laws of war . . . ."111 There is 
scarcely any doubt that this French attitude toward acts of bar-
barism and vandalism committed in the course of an insurrection 
or a civil war applies with equal force to situations involving acts 
against humanity in international law.112 Finally, the same attitude 
has been reflected in recent extradition treaties. Thus, the Con-
vention of January 21, 1949, between Poland and Czechoslovakia118 
provides that extradition will not be granted "if the offence is polit-
ical or is connected with a political offence, unless the character-
istic of an offence under ordinary law predominates .... "114 The 
extradition treaties of other States afford ample endorsement of 
the same principle.115 
101 Art. V, para. 6(a). 
108 Article IO of this law says: "Extradition is not granted for political offenses. It is 
granted, however, even when the guilty person alleges a political motive or end, if the 
act for which it has been requested constitutes primarily a common offense • • • ." 
Unofficial translation, see Harvard Research in International Law, Part I, Extradition, 29 
AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 423 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research]. 
109 See the Wassilief case, [1909] FOREIGN REL. U.S. 519 (1914). For a more recent 
case, see In re Kavic, [1952] Int'l L. Rep. 371 (No. 80) (dictum). Brazil also adheres to 
the same view as illustrated in In re De Bemonville, [1955] Int'l L. Rep. 527 (1958). 
110 Text in Harvard Research 380-81. 
111 Art. 5, para. 2. 
112 Green, Political Offences, War Crimes and Extradition, 11 INT'L &: COMP. L.Q. 
329, 339 (1962). 
113 For text, see 31 U.N.T.S. 262 (1949). 
114 Art. 60, sec. b. 
115 See Extradition Treaty Between Brazil and Bolivia, Feb. 25, 1938, art. Ill, 
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The relevance of the above brief exposition of extradition 
law and practice to crimes against humanity would seem to be 
clear and unmistakable; the same considerations which rationally 
bear upon the determination of whether a crime is a political of-
fense under the domestic law of the states should also be relevant 
in deciding claims of political criminality in respect to crimes 
against humanity. Viewed from that perspective, and having in 
mind the conceptual framework established by the Niirnberg Judg-
ment and the decisions of the war crimes tribunals, it becomes 
evident that crimes against humanity are primarily infractions of 
the ordinary penal law and, therefore, should give rise to the ex-
tradition of the offenders. It is indeed common learning that such 
offenses as murder, extermination, slavery, deportation, torture, 
mayhem and other assaults upon the dignity and worth of the in-
dividual are universally condemned by ethical judgment and are 
made punishable by the criminal laws of all civilized States.116 
It hardly needs reminding that the barbarity and atrocity which 
have been seen to accompany the commission of crimes against 
humanity weigh so heavily upon the common crime element that 
any political motivation completely disappears in the process; the 
surrender of the offender is the only rational course of action.117 
Perhaps the most powerful legal argument offered to support 
the notion that crimes against humanity are political offenses is 
the doctrine of mens rea as a necessary condition of penal responsi-
bility. 118 It is thus forcibly suggested that because of the absence of 
a precise definition of crimes against humanity, the persons accused 
of such offenses do not in fact know of the unlawful character of 
their acts.U0 Since it is a basic condition of political criminality 
that the offender act without mala intentio, the assertion that this 
element of a political offense is present where individuals do not 
sec. 1, 54 U.N.T.S. 348 (1950); Convention between Finland and Sweden, Nov. 29, 
1923, art. 2, para. 1, 33 L.N.T.S. 57 (1924); Convention between Latvia and Lithuania, 
July 12, 1921, art. 2, 25 L.N.T.S. 313 (1924); Additional Protocol to the Extradition Treaty 
Between Argentina and Italy, June 9, 1904, art. IV, [1905] FoREIGN REL. U.S. 33 (1906). 
116 See KEENAN & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 96, at 114. 
117 Garda-Mora, The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition 
and Asylum, 14 U. Pm. L. REv. 371, 395-96 (1953). 
118 For a comprehensive discussion of the application of the principle of mens rea 
by the war crimes tribunals, see McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note 83, at 691-92. 
110 This was brought out by a United States military tribunal in United States v. 
Flick, 6 WAR CRIMES REPORTS I, 1214 (1952), quoting Professor Donnedieu de Vabres. 
See also Donnedieu de Vabres, Le Proces de Nuremberg devant les Principes Modernes 
du Droit Penal International, 70 HAGUE REcuEIL 477, 496 (1947). 
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know of the unlawfulness of their acts appears compelling.120 The 
international jurists who subscribe to this position have substan-
tially concluded that crimes against humanity lack the essential 
elements of an ordinary crime and, therefore, must be regarded 
as political.121 Although this argument seems persuasive at first 
sight, its validity is fatally impaired by other legal considerations 
of great weight. Turning again to the Niirnberg Charter and 
Control Council Law No. 10, it should be clear by now that the 
definition of crimes against humanity therein contained was not 
the result of nebulous legal thinking on the part of the victorious 
belligerents, but represented a codification on the international 
plane of acts that have long been recognized as criminal by the 
domestic criminal law of the States. It appears obvious, therefore, 
that the N iirnberg Charter and Control Council Law No. 10 were 
merely declaratory of existing law.122 Thus, the suggestion that 
the justice of the doctrine of mens rea was substantially violated 
in prosecutions for crimes against humanity is a wholly unjustifi-
able assertion which can be attacked on three grounds. First, the 
crimes defined in the N iimberg Charter and Control Council Law 
No. 10 were universally condemned by domestic legal systems. 
It made no difference whether they were in accord with German 
law or not. It should be recalled that both the Niirnberg Charter 
and Control Council Law No. 10 made those crimes punishable 
"whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country 
where perpetrated."123 The cases decided by the war crimes tribu-
nals uniformly interpreted this provision as barring compliance 
120 Thus, in United States v. List (Hostages case), 11 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 757 (1950), 
the tribunal made reference to the principle of mens rea in the context of superior orders 
as follows: ''We are of the view, however, that if the illegality of the order was not known 
to the inferior, and he could not reasonably have been expected to know of its illegality, 
no wrongful intent necessary to the commission of a crime exists and the inferior will be 
protected." Id. at 1236. 
121 This argument apparently was offered by the defense in the Eichmann trial in 
Israel. For discussion of this point by the court, see 56 AM. J. lNT'L L. 805, 843 (1962). 
It has been argued recently by a distinguished commentator that crimes against humanity 
are not precisely defined and that this point casts doubts upon the legality of the charge 
in the Eichmann trial. ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF 
EvIL (1963). This position obviously iguores the Niirnberg precedent and the line of cases 
decided by the war crimes tribunals. 
122 In this context, the Niirnberg Tribunal said: "The Charter is not an arbitrary 
exercise of power on the part of the victorious Nations, but in the view of the Tribunal, 
as will be shown, it is the expression of international law existing at the time of its 
creation, and to that extent is itself a contribution to international law." 1 TRIAL OF THE 
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 218 (1947). 
123 Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Niirnberg art. 6, para. (c); 
Control Council Law No. 10 art. II, sec. I, para. (c). 
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with domestic law as a defense.124 Second, even if not punishable 
by German law, no reasonable man could be expected to believe 
that the Nazi leaders were not aware of the unlawfulness of the 
acts they committed and of their responsibility to the world com-
munity under international law. Finally, the precedents both of 
the International Military Tribunal and of the war crimes tribunals 
clearly reveal that the plea of mens rea was considered in mitigation 
of war crimes stricto sensu, largely because of the lack of knowl-
edge by individuals acting under superior orders of the technical 
laws and customs of war.125 In the case of crimes against humanity, 
however, the same claim could not legitimately be asserted, for, 
placing a heavy emphasis upon sentiments of humanity that all 
men have in common, the war crimes tribunals applied the less 
complex test that the acts characterized as crimes against humanity 
outrage "fundamental concepts of justice."126 As no one will 
seriously question that assaults upon the dignity and worth of the 
individual outrage the conscience of all civilized men, the existence 
of mens rea in crimes against humanity is more easily found than 
in prosecutions for war crimes proper, for in the latter some knowl-
edge of the unlawfulness of the acts prohibited by the laws and 
customs of war was, in some cases, explicitly required.127 This 
requirement implies some learning in the laws of war, which an 
ordinary soldier could not reasonably be expected to have.128 
lU The Niirnberg Tribunal said: " ..• the very essence of the Charter is that indi-
viduals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience 
imposed by the individual state. He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity 
while acting in pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing action 
moves outside its competence under international law." 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 223 (1947). See also for the 
same proposition, United States v. Altstoetter austice case), 3 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 
983-84 (1951). 
125 See McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, op. cit. supra note 83, at 691. See also GREENSPAN, 
op. cit. supra note 104, at 486. 
126 See United States v. List (Hostages case), 11 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 757, 1236 (1948), 
where the tribunal said "But the general rule is that members of the armed forces are 
bound to obey only the lawful orders of their commanding officers and they cannot 
escape criminal liability by obeying a command which violates international law and out-
rages fundamental concepts of justice." 
127 In re Wintgen, Special Criminal Court, Amsterdam, Holland, July 6, 1949, [1949] 
Ann. Dig. 484 (No. 178). 
128 However, in such cases criminal responsibility is attached to the commanding 
officer involved. See in this connection, In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). It should also 
be mentioned that article 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV of 1907 Concerning the 
Laws and Customs of '\Var says that "The Contracting Powers shall issue instructions to 
their armed land forces which shall be in conformity with the Regulations respecting 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the present Convention." For text, 
see 36 Stat. 2277, 2290 (1910). 
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Applying the foregoing analysis to specific crimes against 
humanity, it would seem axiomatic that the unjustifiable taking 
of human life, whether it be in gas chambers, before firing squads, 
or in laboratories dedicated to vicious medical experiments, is 
murder, and it really does not make any difference whether it be 
regarded as a crime under domestic law or under international 
law.129 The same consideration would apply to the deportation 
and enslavement of the civilian population as well as to prosecu-
tions of ethnic and religious minorities. These acts do not consti-
tute the normal exercise of governmental function, nor the civilized 
behavior of peoples and governments.130 Thus, the broader point 
may be made that crimes against humanity are common crimes, 
and it would result in highly unjust decisions to treat them as 
political. In a somewhat different but cognate context, the Supreme 
Court of Palestine put the matter succinctly but bluntly when it 
said: "We know of nothing in the criminal law of this country or 
of England that creates a special offence called political murder."131 
This opinion not only serves to underscore the fact that crimes 
against humanity are specific types of offenses familiar to the 
domestic criminal law of every civilized country, but also that they 
do not become political because of their international dimensions. 
Apart from these observations, it may still be suggested that 
the acts that constitute crimes against humanity are executed 
during the prosecution of a war and that they are incidental to 
and form a part of this overriding political objective.132 The fal-
lacy contained in this suggestion is reasonably obvious, for it over-
looks the fundamental legal postulate that even during war, 
governments must conform to standards of decency and humanity 
in their dealings with both their own citizens and the so-called 
enemy population. Moreover, it proceeds from the illusion that 
120 KEENAN & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 96, at 118. 
130 Thus, in United States v. Ohlendorf (Einsatzgruppen case), 4 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 
1, 411 (1950), the tribunal observed that the massacre of human beings was "so beyond the 
experience of normal man and the range of man-made phenomena that only the most 
complete judicial inquiry, and the most exhaustive trial, could verify and confirm them." 
131 Yousef Said Abu Dourrah v. The Attorney-General, Supreme Court of Palestine, 
Jan. 20, 1941, [1941-1942] Ann. Dig. 331, 332 (No. 101). See also Evans, supra note 93, at 12. 
132 In United States v. Pohl, 5 WAR CRIMES REPORTS 193, 967 (1947), the tribunal said: 
"We have been told many times, 'Germany was engaged in total war. Our national life 
was endangered. Everyone had to work.' This cannot mean that everyone must work for 
Germany in her waging of criminal aggressive war. It certainly cannot mean that Russian 
and Polish, and Dutch, and Norwegian noncombatants, including women and children, 
could be forced to work as slaves in the manufacture of war material to be used against 
their own countrymen and to destroy their own homelands." 
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a political motive or objective converts an otherwise ordinary 
crime into a political offense.133 What apparently requires special 
emphasis is that mass killings, deportations, and the systematic 
elimination of helpless ethnic groups outrage the moral judgment 
of mankind and, certainly, no reasonable man can regard the 
commission of these acts as innocent.134 Thus, if any merit remains 
to the argument relating to mens rea, it might be applied to war 
crimes stricto sensu, for these involve acts that violate the laws and 
customs of war, the unlawfulness of which may or may not be 
known. In fact, the prosecutions on the charge of war crimes 
proper afford enough evidence to conclude that if a case was made 
that the accused did not know the unlawful nature of the act in 
question, he was not held responsible.135 These observations lend 
support to the proposition that in the case of crimes against human-
ity there is sufficient mens rea to regard the offenders as ordinary 
criminals, thus ruling out the possibility that their crimes be 
considered as political. 
The third factor militating against the proposition that crimes 
against humanity are political offenses relates to the motivation of 
the offender. As indicative of the kind of consideration that under-
lies the commission of political offenses, the Supreme Court of 
Chile recently said that political offenses are committed for motives 
of public concern and are characterized "by altruistic or patriotic 
sentiments, while criminal offences arise from egoistical motives" 
such as revenge, hate, profit and the like.136 The most conspicu-
ous fact about the crimes for which the Nazi leaders were prose-
cuted is that these offenses were not inspired by any altruistic or 
patriotic motive, but by the strictly personal considerations of 
revenge against a given enemy population or hatred against a spe-
cific ethnic or religious group.137 The deportation and enslave-
ment of civilian inhabitants of countries under German belliger-
ent occupation are illustrations of the former, while the ruthless 
persecution and murder of the Jewish people in Europe is an 
133 Cf. Garcfa-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradi-
tion Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226, 1251 (1962). 
184 STONE, op. cit. supra note 102, at 361. 
1sis See notes 120, 127 supra. 
1sa Re Campora, Chile Supreme Court, Sept. 24, 1957, [1957] Int'l L. Rep. 518, 521 
(1961). 
137 United States v. Milch, 2 WAR Cru:MES REPORTS 359 (1947). The tribunal made 
mention of the fact that the defendant acquiesced in a plan of extermination of the Jews 
to the end that "when this war ends, there will be no more Jews in Europe." Id. at 789. 
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example of the latter. The obvious point of emphasis is that 
revenge and hate are usually the motivations of an ordinary crime 
and not the expression of any political conviction.188 Offenses 
motivated by political conviction are acts directed against the 
State, which, although conceded to be unlawful, constitute nonex-
traditable offenses precisely because they may be the result of an 
honest desire of the individual to change what he regards as an 
unjust situation. Moreover, they do not violate any rights of 
private persons.189 But when, in the course of a revolution or a 
war, the requirements of humanity are disregarded and needless 
suffering is inflicted upon persons having no connection with the 
State or even with the conduct of hostilities, there cannot be the 
slightest doubt that these offenses are directed against private 
persons and that the public rights of the State are not in any way 
affected.140 The existence of a political motivation thus is lacking 
in situations of this kind. Moreover, the extradition of the offenders 
by other States would seem to constitute the only sanction of inter-
national law which might guarantee the observance of standards 
of decency and humanity in the course of political upheavals. It 
may be suggested, however, that if the doctrine of nonextradition 
of political offenders is to signify something more than just a means 
of assuring refuge to those who rebel against the prevailing political 
order, it should be adapted and related, not so exclusively to the 
nature of the offense involved, but rather primarily to the effect 
that these offenses have upon the observance of human rights. It 
should, therefore, be a common principle of all States that the 
legitimate purpose of the exemption in favor of political offenders 
is not to protect automatically every political rebel, but rather 
to protect those whose rights are the object of aggression by govern-
188 In the Swiss case In re Vogt, Switzerland, Federal Court, Jan. 26, 1924, the court 
found that the act of taking hostages in the course of a riot was an act of personal 
revenge, which was "another factor showing that there was no political element in the 
act." For text, see [1923-1924] Ann. Dig. 285-86 (No. 165). 
189 In this connection, a Court of Appeal of France said: " ••• what distinguishes the 
political crime from the common crime is the fact that the former only affects the 
political organisation of the state, the proper rights of the state, while the latter exclusively 
affects rights other than those of the state." See In re Giovanni Gatti, Court of Appeal of 
Grenoble, France (Chambre des Mises en Accusation) Jan. 13, 1947, [1947] Ann. Dig. 145 
(No. 70). 
140 The Swiss Federal Tribunal said in this regard: "To seize as hostages private persons 
who have no part in the quarrel between the authorities and the rioters cannot according 
to Swiss conceptions be regarded as a means justified by its political end." In re Vogt, 
Switzerland, Federal Court, Jan. 26, 1924, [1923-1924] Ann. Dig., at 285. 
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mental authorities.141 From such a perspective, it would seem in-
exorably to follow that since crimes against humanity involve the 
commission of cruelties and barbarities upon innocent and help-
less people, the perpetrators of these offenses should not be allowed 
to hide behind the nonextradition principle, for this doctrine was 
initially designed for the protection of human rights, not to shelter 
those who trample upon human beings with impunity. 
III. THE EXTRADITION OF OFFENDERS u NDER 
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS 
Faithfully reflecting mankind's sentiments that the commission 
of atrocities by the Nazi officials be punished after World War II, 
President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin 
issued a joint declaration on November I, 1943, firmly stating 
their conviction that "at the time of the granting of any armistice 
to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German 
officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been 
responsible for, or have taken a consenting part in ... atrocities, 
massacres and executions, will be sent back to countries in which 
their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged 
and punished .... "142 However, when in pursuance of this policy 
the neutral nations were requested to extradite the persons accused 
of such offenses, they strongly expressed their unwillingness to 
grant extradition.143 Their refusal to surrender these individuals 
was largely based upon the alleged political character of the acts 
with which the individuals were charged.144 The resolution of 
February 13, 1946,145 of the United Nations General Assembly 
offers still a further acknowledgment of the attitude of the world 
community regarding persons accused of crimes against humanity. 
The resolution recommended the members of the United Nations 
to extradite the offenders "to the countries in which their abomi-
nable deeds were done, in order that they may be judged and pun-
141 It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court of the Federal Republic of 
Germany has recently interpreted the right of asylum as extending to persons fearing 
persecution because of their political views and not merely applicable to those accused 
of political offenses stricto sensu. See Extradition (Ecuadorian National) case, German 
Federal Republic, Federal Supreme Court, Jan. 21, 1953, (1953] Int'! L. Rep. 370, 371 (1957). 
142 For text see 9 DEP'T ST.,.TE BuLL. 307, 311 (1943). (Emphasis added.) See also (1945] 
FOREIGN REL. U.S. 403 (1955). 
143 For communications to this effect, see 12 DEP'T ST.,.TE BuLL. 190 (1945). 
14-4 See Neumann, Neutral States and the Extradition of War Criminals, 45 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 495, 500 (1951). 
rn, For the text of this resolution, see (1946-1947] U.N. YB. 66. 
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ished according to the laws of those countries .... " It also called 
upon nonmembers of the United Nations "to take all necessary 
measures for the apprehension of such criminals in their respective 
territories with a view to their immediate removal to the countries 
in which the crimes were committed for the purpose of trial and 
punishment according to the laws of those countries."146 Substan-
tially the same policy objectives were subsequently incorporated 
into the resolutions of December 15, 1946,147 and of October 31, 
1947.148 While the principle laid down in these resolutions is 
compelling, the expectation that the States would formulate their 
extradition policy on such a basis was doomed to failure for two 
reasons. First, the functions and powers of the General Assembly 
are limited to discussion and the making of recommendations, uo 
and do not include the competence to make legally binding deci-
sions upon the members of the United Nations. It should, there-
fore, be clear that the resolutions here discussed lacked the neces-
sary legal force to modify long-standing principles of extradition 
law, which are embodied in domestic enactments, treaties and 
judicial decisions.150 If these resolutions have any merit, it is the 
recognition by the bulk of the community of States that persons 
accused of crimes against humanity should not find refuge from 
the legitimate prosecution of the aggrieved nations. Second, while 
a resolution of the General Assembly determining a given course 
of conduct does have some consequence for the formulation of 
State policy,151 the implementation of such a policy is to be made 
by individual governments in accordance with their own laws and 
practices. Therefore, it is not surprising to recount that the reasons 
of policy embodied in the Assembly's resolutions have found 
little or no acceptance by governments, as evidenced by the number 
of cases of refusal to surrender persons accused of crimes against 
humanity.152 
146 Ibid. 
147 Id. at 170. 
148 Id. at 222. 
149 U.N. Charter arts. 10-11. See, however, the "Uniting for Peace Resolution," adopted 
by the General Assembly on Nov. 3, 1950, in which the General Assembly is vested 
with specific peace enforcement functions. For text, see U.N. GEN. Ass., OFF. REc., 5th 
Sess. Supp. No. 20, at 10 (A/1775) (1950). 
1150 Karaclzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198, 205 (9th Cir. 1957). 
151 See McDOUGAL&: FELICIANO, LAw AND MINIMUM WoRLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE LEGAL 
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 429 (1961). 
1152 For cases illustrating this point, see Green, supra note 112, at 346-49. Most 
recently, in June 1961, the United States refused the extradition to the Soviet Union of a 
Lithuanian national accused of wartime mass murders on the ground that "a person 
accused of wartime mass murders might not get a trial in the Soviet Union that would 
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The undertaking to surrender offenders charged with crimes 
against humanity was reiterated in somewhat more effective terms 
in the peace treaties with certain States terminating World War II. 
Thus, according to the peace treaty with Italy signed on February 
10, 1947,1158 Italy agreed to "take all the necessary steps to ensure 
the apprehension and surrender for trial of . . . persons accused 
of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes and crimes 
against peace or humanity.''1154 Substantially similar provisions are 
found in the peace treaties with Rumania,11515 Bulgaria,1156 Finland,1157 
and Hungary.1158 Although it is quite true that the impact of these 
prescriptions is greatly limited in that the obligation to extradite 
offenders charged with crimes against humanity is applicable only 
to the signatory parties, the submission would nevertheless seem 
relevant to the extent that the peace treaties go beyond the tradi-
tional norms of extradition law. In this respect, the principle of 
protecting human rights in time of war is clearly evidenced.1119 
A more ambitious and far-reaching obligation to extradite per-
sons accused of crimes against humanity has been incorporated 
into the Geneva Conventions No. IV of August 12, 1949, Relative 
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,160 and the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, 161 both of which were previously mentioned. In the 
Geneva Convention, the pertinent provision says: 
be considered fair according to United States standards." See N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1962, 
p. 12, col. 6. Also in 1961 the Italian Court of Final Appeal ruled that racial persecution 
is a political offense, thus denying the extradition of a German national to Germany. 
See N.Y. Times, April 7, 1961, p. 3, col. 8. 
1158 For text, see 49 U.N.T.S. 143 (1950); 42 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 47 (1948). 
1154 Peace Treaty with Italy art. 45, para. (a). 
11515 Art. 6 (a). For text, see 42 U.N.T.S. 34 (1949); 42 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 252 (1948). 
156 Art. 5, para. (a). For text, see 41 U.N.T.S. 50 (1949); 42 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 179 
(1948). 
1157 Art. 9, para. (a). For text, see 48 U.N.T.S. 228 (1950); 42 AM. J. INT'L L. SuPP. 203 
(1948). 
1158 Art. 6, para. (a). For text, see 41 U.N.T.S. 168 (1949); 42 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 225 
(1948). 
1150 It should be mentioned in the same connection that the Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees Adopted in Geneva on July 28, 1951, by a United Nations Conference 
of Plenipotentiaries provides in article 1, paragraph F that "The provisions of this Con-
vention shall not apply to any persons with respect to whom there are serious reasons 
for considering that: (a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime 
against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision 
in respect of such crimes .•.. " For text, see U.N. Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Final Act and Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (A/conf.) (2/108) at 16-17 (1951). 
160 For text, see [1955] 3 U.S.T. &: O.I.A. 3516, T .I.A.S. No. 3365 (effective Feb. 2, 1956). 
161 For text, see U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 3d Sess., 1st pt., Res. No. 260 at 174 (A/81-) 
(1948). 
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"Each High Contracting Party shall be under the obli-
gation to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to 
have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall 
bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before its 
own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with 
the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons for 
trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided 
such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie 
case."162 
The "grave breaches" to which the preceding article refers are 
carefully enumerated in another provision of the Convention. 
Since this stipulation is reminiscent of the description of crimes 
against humanity given in the Niirnberg Charter, it may be of 
some benefit to include it here in full. 
"Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall 
be those involving any of the following acts, if committed 
against persons or property protected by the present Conven-
tion: wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including 
biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or 
serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or 
transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, com-
pelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile 
Power, or wilfully depriving a protected person of the right 
of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, 
taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation 
of property, not justified by military necessity and carried 
out unlawfully and wantonly."163 
Coupling this provision with the previous one providing for 
the extradition of persons accused of grave breaches of the Con-
vention, it is apparent that the signatory States are now legally 
bound to surrender persons accused of crimes against humanity 
162 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War art. 146, [1955] 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3516, 3616, T.I.A.S. No. 3365. (Emphasis added.) The 
same provision is found in the other three Geneva Conventions as follows: Convention 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armed Forces in the 
Field art. 49, [1955] 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3114, 3146, T.I.A.S. No. 3362; Convention for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed 
Forces at Sea art. 50, [1955] 3 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3217, 3250, T .I.A.S. No. 3363; Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 126, [1955] 3 U.S.T. &: O.I.A. 3lH6, 
3418, T .I.A.S. No. 3364. 
163 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of ,var 
art. 147. The other Conventions also contain provisions enumerating the grave breaches 
which are punishable. E.g., Wounded and Sick in the Field art. 50; Wounded, Sick and 
Shipwrecked at Sea art. 51; and Prisoners of War art. 130. 
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committed in time of war. Indeed, it has been submitted that these 
articles will adequately cover the extradition of offenders against 
humanity in the future.164 While the cogency of this suggestion 
is unquestioned, it is believed, however, that the Geneva Conven-
tion No. IV does not impose an absolute obligation to surrender. 
The observation may be made that article 146 imposes upon the 
signatory States two kinds of obligations. The first obligation 
binds the contracting parties "to search for persons alleged to 
have committed, or to have ordered to be committed" grave 
breaches of the Convention and to prosecute them before their 
own courts. The language in which this obligation is expressed 
leaves no room for doubt that it is mandatory in character and, 
thus, imports the duty of the contracting parties to amend their 
laws if necessary in order to ensure the prosecution of offend-
ers. The second commitment under article 146, to "hand such 
persons for trial to another High Contracting Party," is greatly 
impaired by its permissive character, for the parties not only have 
a choice to grant or to deny extradition, but the determination of 
this whole question is entirely dependent upon each country's 
extradition law and practice. The liberty granted to the States 
by this provision is rather extensive, for widely accepted doctrines 
of extradition law, such as the prohibition to extradite apart from 
treaty, the doctrine of double criminality, the nonextradition of 
nationals and others may become relevant in order to defeat the 
surrender of an offender.165 It should therefore be clear that the 
Geneva Convention in question still affords no foundation for 
the assertion that under its terms persons accused of crimes 
against humanity will be extradited to another contracting State.166 
What the Convention has obviously done is merely to suggest 
that a government may, "if it prefers," hand over an offender to 
a country requesting his extradition, but at the same time it leaves 
to the requested government sufficient discretion to determine 
the matter in the light of its own legislation. It is, thus, quite 
possible for a government to regard some of the breaches of the 
Convention as political offenses for which extradition will be 
164 See Yingling &: Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 393, 
426 (1952). 
165 For a comprehensive discussion of these doctrines in the context of asylum, see 
GARcfA-MoRA, INTERNATlONAL LAw AND AsYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT 53-72 (1956). . 
166 See Gutteridge, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 26 BRIT. Yn. INT'L L. 294, 306 
(1949). 
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denied.167 Without in any way belittling the good faith and 
humanitarian concern of its draftsmen, it may be concluded that 
with respect to the extradition of offenders, the weakness of the 
Geneva Convention No. IV is glaringly obvious and, on such bases, 
it can hardly be expected to achieve satisfactory results. 
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide offers more promising expectations in so far 
as the extradition of offenders is concerned. After reciting that 
"Genocide and the other acts enumerated in Article III shall not 
be considered as political crimes for the purpose of extradition," it 
goes on to say that "The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in 
such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and 
treaties in force."168 Two implications would seem to follow from 
this provision. The first is that under no circumstances can the 
parties to the Convention regard genocide as a political offense. m 
The overriding purpose of the Convention is to punish genocide 
as an ordinary crime and the States cannot invoke their laws and 
practices to reach a different result. To this extent, one category 
of crimes against humanity has become an ordinary crime by the 
consensus of mankind.170 The second implication indicates that 
the contracting parties have assumed the explicit obligation to 
extradite persons accused of genocide to any government request-
ing their surrender. This is clearly a mandatory provision and no 
exception can be engrafted into its terms. The Convention itself, 
167 Ibid. 
168 Genocide Convention art. VII. 
169 Article VII of the Genocide Convention should be compared with article !I of the 
Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, adopted on April 20, 1929. 
This article provides that counterfeiting "should be punishable as an ordinary crime." 
For text, see 4 HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 2692-705 (19!11). Certainly, this is not 
a mandatory provision so that the States still have considerable liberty to regard counter-
feiting as a political offense. 
170 It may be worth mentioning that the New Yugoslav Criminal Code, enacted on 
March 2, 1951, provides for the punishment of genocide in article 124 as follows: "Whoever, 
with intent to exterminate completely or partially a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group commits homicides or inflicts grievous bodily injuries, or gravely ruins physical 
or mental health of members of such group, or forcefully displaces the population, or 
places such group under the conditions of life leading to complete or partial extermination 
of the group, or applies measures calculated to prevent propagation of members of such a 
group, or forcefully sends children to another group, shall be punished by imprisonment 
for not less than five years or by death." For text, see 46 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. !16, 40 
(1952). This provision is reminiscent of the crimes against humanity tried and punished 
in the war crimes trials. See to the same effect section 5 of the Crime of Genocide .Act, 
enacted by the Israeli Parliament on March 29, 1950, [1950] U.N. YB. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
162 (1952). 
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with its clear statement of humanitarian purpose and positive 
undertakings, must be construed, not as giving the signatory 
States a choice between either enacting internal legislation for the 
extradition of offenders or merely refusing to do so, but rather, 
as committing them to a domestic course of action consistent with 
its aims. It is largely in this respect that the Genocide Convention 
differs radically from the Geneva Convention. Therefore, in order 
that the Genocide Convention may attain the purpose for which 
it was concluded, the contracting parties should amend their 
extradition law and practice if necessary so that those accused of 
genocide will be extradited as ordinary criminals. This last com-
mitment is of capital importance, for it will reduce to sheer ir-
relevancy the defense characteristically invoked in extradition 
proceedings that crimes against humanity are political offenses.171 
It remains to observe that the stipulation of the Convention 
to the effect that extradition is to be granted by the parties "in 
accordance with their laws and treaties in force," is not to be con-
strued as a limitation upon the obligation to surrender. In view 
of the other provisions of the Convention, it is not at all unreason-
able to assert that this stipulation merely allows the States the 
liberty to apply their own laws and treaties in so far as the procedure 
to surrender is concerned. To put the matter in different terms, 
the obligation to extradite offenders is clear and unmistakable, but 
the manner in which extradition will be carried out may be made 
by each country in accordance with already established procedures 
as found in extradition laws and treaties. This is a most reasonable 
provision, for it is common knowledge that extradition procedures 
vary substantially from country to country,172 and, therefore, to 
compel States to abandon them really would amount to imposing 
an obligation of a highly questionable value. 
171 A striking illustration of the use of this plea as a defense is found in Karadwle 
v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957). Also in 1961 the Italian Court of Final Appeal 
held that racial persecution is a political crime, thereby denying the extradition of a 
German national under sentence in Munich. The defendant was Professor Ludwig Zind, 
who was sentenced to one year's imprisonment for having publicly expressed approval of 
the Nazi leaders who had executed millions of Jews during World War II. He offered as 
a defense that he was wanted in Germany for a political crime. For report of this case, 
see N.Y. Times, April 7, 1961, p. 3, col. 7. 
172 Thus, in some countries extradition is an executive determination, while in others, 
including the United States and Great Britain, the requested individual has an opportunity 
for a judicial hearing. For the procedure in the United States, see 18 U.S.C § 3184 (1958). 
For discussion, see BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 473 (2d ed. 1962). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
From the examination of crimes against humanity presented 
in these pages, a conclusion may be formulated in terms of prin-
ciples designed to serve as guidelines for future extradition law 
and practice. The focus is upon the nonpolitical aspect of these 
crimes and the need to achieve agreement regarding the extradi-
tion of the offenders. While, of course, it is true that a substantial 
measure of agreement has been attained for the extradition or 
those who violate the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War and the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, there 
are still other crimes against humanity on which agreement has 
not been reached and which are susceptible of being regarded 
as political offenses. For present purposes the principle that should 
underlie this whole area of extradition law is the necessity for 
excluding from the category of political offenses crimes that cause 
unnecessary suffering and useless destruction of human lives. By 
ensuring the extradition and punishment of these offenders both 
in peace and in war, international law will offer some basis for 
the hope that, perhaps for the first time in history, a measure of 
control may be achieved over the means used to conduct hostilities 
or to change an internal political situation. The sad record of in-
humanity disclosed at Niirnberg and at the other war crimes 
trials affords foundation for the assertion that man is quite capable 
of causing the destruction of his fellow man in the pursuit of 
purely personal objectives. It· is submitted that this is precisely 
the motivation underlying the commission of crimes against hu-
manity. The absence of any political motivation is strikingly clear. 
On such a basis, the surrender of the offenders appears as the only 
just course of action. It is hoped that the States will amend their 
extradition law and practice so as to include crimes against humani-
ty in the category of extraditable offenses. This step would contrib-
ute substantially to the formulation of an international law deeply 
rooted in the protection of human rights and values. 
